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1  CHAPTER 7  
 What Are Intentions? 
 Elisabeth  Pacherie and  Patrick  Haggard 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Neuroscientiﬁ c work on intentions and voluntary 
actions has tended to focus on very short time 
scales, immediately before movement onset. As a 
prime example, the intentions investigated by 
Benjamin Libet are states that are ﬁ rst con-
sciously experienced on average 200 ms before 
action onset. Libet’s experiments showed that 
these conscious intentions were reliably 
preceded by a few hundred milliseconds by a 
negative brain potential, the so-called readiness 
potential. The existence of this antecedent 
unconscious brain activity indicated that the 
action was initiated unconsciously rather than 
by the conscious intention. This led Libet to the 
conclusion that we do not have full-blown “free 
will.” However, he attempted to salvage a limited 
form of free will by suggesting that although we 
cannot consciously initiate actions, we can still 
consciously veto them in the 200 ms interval 
between conscious intention and action onset. 
Libet’s conception of free will and his interpreta-
tion of his results have been widely discussed 
and criticized. 
 Here, we take as our starting point one of 
these lines of criticism, voiced notably by Shaun 
Gallagher ( 2006 ). Gallagher argues that it is mis-
guided to attempt to frame the question of free 
will at the time scale and in terms of the very 
short-term motor intentions and control pro-
cesses Libet considers. Rather, free will involves 
temporally extended deliberative processes and 
applies to intentional actions considered at levels 
of description typically higher and more abstract 
than descriptions in terms of motor processes 
and bodily movements. In earlier work, one of us 
(Pacherie,  2008 ) proposed a three-tiered hierar-
chical model of intentions, the DPM model, 
distinguishing distal or prospective intentions, 
proximal or immediate intentions, and motor 
intentions; the other (Hagggard,  2008 ) offered a 
naturalized model of human volition involving a 
set of decision-making processes concerned with 
whether to act, what to do (and how), and when 
to act. If Gallagher is right about the temporal 
and intentional framework relevant for the exer-
cise of free will, a discussion of free will must at 
least include not only the contribution of inten-
tions to the ﬁ nal process of action initiation itself, 
but also the anterior decision processes that take 
place at the level of prospective intentions. 
 1. IMMEDIATE INTENTION AND 
ACTION INITIATION 
 Providing a satisfactory deﬁ nition of intention is 
notoriously difﬁ cult. In this chapter, we assume 
that intention is a mental state, which may be 
associated with particular brain states. But what 
 kind of mental state is an intention? We suggest 
that intentions have two distinguishing features. 
First, they are accessible to consciousness. 
Second, they bear some relation to subsequent 
action. This relation could be distinctive for two 
reasons: a causal reason or a content reason. Let 
us take a physical movement of the body (I raise 
my arm) as a paradigm of action. The causal 
reason suggests that the intention (I intend to 
raise my arm) is simply the mental state that 
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1 causes the action of lifting my arm (Wittgenstein, 
 1953 ). Intentions thus explain why actions occur, 
and serve as the guarantors of volition. This view 
is clearly vulnerable to skeptical attack: folk 
psychology may ﬁ nd it convenient to have some 
appropriate explanation of a person’s actions, 
and the concept of intention could be designed 
to fulﬁ ll this purpose. The fact that intentions do 
a good job of explaining actions does not there-
fore constitute evidence that they are a bona ﬁ de 
mental state. 
 The content argument suggests the content 
of the intention (“I will raise my arm”) is some-
how linked to the speciﬁ c details of the arm-
raising action. This view makes clearer 
predictions about what might constitute an 
intention. For example, if I perform two differ-
ent actions, raising my left arm on one occasion 
and my right arm on another, the intentions for 
each action should have different contents, capa-
ble of explaining which arm is used for the action 
in each case. The content of intention should be 
discriminative, in the sense that it should predict 
speciﬁ c details of action. The content argument 
emphasizes the continuity between decision and 
intention: when someone decides to do A rather 
than B, they may develop an intention whose 
speciﬁ c content will relate to A rather than to B. 
A number of neuroscientiﬁ c studies have 
attempted to decode the brain processes predict-
ing the speciﬁ c content of a subsequent action 
(Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes,  2008 ; Haggard 
& Eimer,  1999 ). This level of motor content 
would typically be generated once the speciﬁ c 
situation and context of action are established, 
and only immediately before action initiation. 
Because intention, viewed in this way, is very 
close to the details of motor execution, we use 
the term “immediate intention” to refer to it. 
 Interestingly, although Libet’s work (Libet, 
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl,  1983 ) occupies a cen-
tral role in modern scientiﬁ c work on intention, 
he himself appeared to avoid the word. On the 
one hand, he speaks of the “unconscious initia-
tion” of action. This refers to the set of brain 
processes that ultimately give rise to muscular 
movement. The readiness potential generated by 
the frontal motor areas of the brain is a conve-
nient marker that these processes have begun, 
but Libet avoids making the simplistic claim that 
the onset of the readiness potential simply 
constitutes initiation. On the other hand, the 
conscious experience of immediate intention (W 
judgment) occurs several hundred milliseconds 
after the readiness potential onset, and only 
slightly before movement itself. If the W judgment 
is taken as the marker of conscious intention, 
then, our conscious intentions cannot be the 
cause or explanation of our actions, because 
intention follows neural initiation of action, 
rather than precedes it. 
 But is the W judgment really a marker of 
immediate conscious intention? Libet himself 
speaks of an “urge to act.” Participants are 
supposed to report the moment when this urge 
begins. This is clearly one of the weaker points of 
the experimental method. How do participants 
know what they are supposed to report? Could 
the instruction to report urges somehow suggest 
to the subject that they should have a speciﬁ c 
experience of immediate intention that would 
otherwise remain unconscious? Could the 
instruction suggest to subjects the need to report 
a moment slightly before action, even if they 
have no distinctive conscious experience at that 
moment? Participants might interpret the 
instructions in such experiments as “Behave as if 
you had free will, and make your reports of 
intention consistent with this concept of free 
will.” If this were the case, then such experiments 
could not separate the inﬂ uence of folk psychol-
ogy from any genuine mental state of intention, 
making them vulnerable to skeptical attack, or 
even scientiﬁ cally worthless. 
 EVIDENCE FROM DIRECT 
CORTICAL STIMULATION 
 Clearly, experimental manipulations of inten-
tion that do not depend on instructions, and 
therefore avoid the worst problems of sugges-
tion, are highly desirable. Perhaps the most 
informative data come from reports of direct 
cortical stimulation prior to neurosurgery for 
epilepsy. Methodologically, these data clearly 
differ from psychological experiments relying on 
participants’ understanding of instructions. In 
fact, no instruction is given at all: the patient’s 
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1 behavior during stimulation is observed, and 
they are invited to report anything that they feel. 
Little detail is generally given about  how the 
reporting is done. Few neurosurgical studies 
seem to address the problems of experimenter-
led suggestion and response bias, for example, 
by including catch trials without stimulation. 
Nevertheless, these data have particular signiﬁ -
cance for the psychology of intention, and are 
therefore worth examining in some detail. 
 Direct stimulation data broadly support a 
distinction between initiation of action and con-
scious immediate intention. In particular, 
we shall argue that direct stimulation of the 
presupplementary motor area (preSMA) is 
accompanied by an anticipatory conscious expe-
rience of immediate intention. In contrast, direct 
stimulation of the deeper cingulate motor area 
(CMA) produces a strong  motivation to perform 
a speciﬁ c action, and can trigger action initiation, 
but without any particular  speciﬁ c conscious 
experience prior to action. In the neurosurgical 
literature, and in Libet’s work also, the word 
“urge” is widely used. We argue that the same 
word is used with two quite different meanings, 
which have been unnecessarily confounded. 
On the one hand, an urge involves a conscious 
experience of being about to act. On the other 
hand, an urge involves a feeling of compulsion, 
or having to. We suggest these two components 
are localized to the preSMA and the CMA respec-
tively. Rather than the general term “urge” we 
suggest that the terms immediate intention and 
motivation to act might be more appropriate. 
 Pre-SMA Stimulation Can Evoke a State 
Resembling Immediate Intention 
 The awake patient reports a subjective experi-
ence or “urge to move” during stimulation of 
characteristic cortical regions, notably the sup-
plementary motor area. The study closest to our 
interest is that by Fried et al.  (1991) . The paper 
reports responses to stimulation through intrac-
ranial grids over the mesial frontal cortex. In one 
patient, several reports of “urge” were obtained 
following low-amplitude stimulation over the 
supplementary motor area. The responses 
typically referred to a speciﬁ c contralateral 
body part, as in “urge to move the right elbow.” 
In some trials, different verbal formulas appear: 
“need to move,” “feeling as if movement were 
about to occur.” At higher stimulation intensi-
ties, actual movements were often evoked. 
The authors comment that the actual movement 
evoked was not necessarily commensurate with 
the urge. However, urge and movement at least 
referred to the same limb in the majority of trials 
reported for this patient. 
 The ability to evoke by external intervention 
a mental state that appears close to conscious 
intention is intriguing. However, several impor-
tant methodological questions remain. How 
general are these sensations: they receive promi-
nent attention in the report of one case, but it is 
unclear whether they were investigated and 
found to be absent, or merely not investigated, 
in the remaining cases? What phenomenal expe-
rience does the stimulation cause? Beyond the 
frequent use of the word “urge” there is little 
information on phenomenology. One particular 
concern would be whether the experience 
reported as “urge” is truly an anticipatory expe-
rience of central origin, and occurring in advance 
of movement. Could “urge” actually reﬂ ect 
subtle muscle contractions caused by low-
intensity stimulation, which lacked the strength 
required to produce observable movement? 
Alternatively, could “urge” reﬂ ect a sensory 
experience, like the “tingling” sensation fre-
quently reported following stimulation at sites 
close to those provoking “urge” (Fried et al, 
 1991 )? The preSMA is known to receive sensory 
afferent input, probably after initial processing 
in somatosensory cortical areas (Mima et al, 
 1999 ). In conditions such as Tourette’s syn-
drome and restless legs syndrome, the urge to 
move is strongly associated with, or is simply 
described as, a  sensory quality localized in 
speciﬁ c body parts, and relieved by movement of 
those body parts. If urges were essentially 
sensory in nature, they clearly would not be a 
good model for conscious intention. Interestingly, 
however, a recent review of a series of 52 patients 
who underwent electrical stimulation suggests 
sensory experiences are not a normal feature of 
preSMA stimulation, being recorded in only a 
single instance (Chassagnon, Minotti, Kremer, 
Hoffmann, & Kahane,  2008 ). In fact, they were 
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1 much more common following stimulation of 
the posterior portion of the CMA. It seems likely 
that preSMA stimulation produces a speciﬁ c 
conscious experience, distinct from both stimu-
lation-evoked sensation and from peripheral 
sensation. This experience, like immediate inten-
tion, is motorically speciﬁ c, and linked to an 
impending action. 
 CMA Stimulation Produces Motivated but 
Automatized Actions 
 In fact, the stimulation of the CMA, and particu-
larly of the region of the cingulate sulcus 
immediately below the preSMA, seems to corre-
spond more closely to Libet’s “unconscious 
initiation of a . . . voluntary act.” Chassagnon 
et al. ( 2008 ) report four instances where CMA 
stimulation elicited reaching and grasping 
behaviors, “as if the patients were groping 
around and handling a small object in the dark.” 
There is no speciﬁ c report or evidence of urge 
 prior to actual movement. An extended report of 
one patient in this series (Kremer, Chassagnon, 
Hoffmann, Benabid, & Kahane,  2001 ) shows 
that these behaviors had a compulsive, irresist-
ible quality. This patient had a strong drive to 
perform the movement once stimulation began, 
making scanning eye movements and explor-
atory arm movements to identify a potential 
target for grasping. The patient is described as 
having an “urge to grasp something.” However, 
it remains hard to locate this feeling of urge 
within the chain of events linked to the action. In 
particular, no quantitative data is given on two 
details that are of primary importance for the 
psychology of intention: the delay between stim-
ulation onset and movement onset, and the delay 
between stimulation onset and any sense of 
“urge.” We suggest that this patient showed 
“urge” in the motivational sense during CMA 
stimulation, but they did not experience the kind 
of anticipatory conscious awareness characteristic 
of immediate intentions. 
 A more extensive study of actions evoked by 
CMA stimulation in 83 epileptic patients was 
reported by Bancaud, Talairach, Geier, Bonis, 
Trottier, and Manrique ( 1976 ). Stimulation gen-
erally produced an increased state of arousal and 
attentiveness, often at low stimulation intensities. 
This was interpreted as a nonspeciﬁ c form of 
attention to action. At higher stimulation inten-
sities, a range of coordinated manual, buccal, and 
oculomotor actions were produced. Interest-
ingly, if an object were given to the participant 
during stimulation, it would evoke complex 
series of object-appropriate movements. For 
example, when one patient was given a cigarette, 
they lit and smoked it in a compulsive manner, 
stopping smoking when stimulation ceased, and 
restarting when stimulation restarted. In other 
cases, patients compulsively ate food they were 
offered, or brought objects to the mouth and 
sucked them. Again, ceasing stimulation caused 
the action to end. When the experimenters phys-
ically restrained the patient’s arms, the patient 
often strove to continue the action, especially 
at greater stimulation intensities. This sustained 
drive to achieve the action is not merely a 
matter of maintaining motor output in the 
face of perturbation, since in one case the 
patient transferred an object repeatedly be-
tween the hands to overcome the experimenter’s 
interference. 
 What did the patients experience? While 
Bancaud et al. do not address this point system-
atically, the general attitude of the patients 
toward their own evoked actions appeared indif-
ferent. Patients acknowledged the action they 
had performed immediately afterward, but did 
not generally give speciﬁ c reasons why they 
performed it, nor did they appear surprised by 
actions that might prima facie seem strange. 
On questioning the next day, the patients did 
not ﬁ nd their actions under stimulation in any 
way surprising or unusual. One way of interpret-
ing this unusual phenomenology of action would 
suggest that the CMA drives actions, without 
any reference to conscious intentions, desires, or 
reasons for action. For example, a patient 
presented with a fruit in the absence of stimula-
tion would merely hold it. But once stimulated, 
the patient would grasp and eat the fruit for as 
long as the stimulation lasted. This compulsive 
eating was not part of a normal desire for food, 
since it ceased with the end of stimulation. 
 In summary, CMA stimulation transiently 
induced a syndrome similar to utilization behavior 
(Lhermitte,  1983 ). The overall impression is of a 
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1 CMA role in motivating and driving behavior, 
but not in anticipating, or monitoring or adjusting 
it to circumstances, nor in providing a conscious 
experience of an impending action. The state 
evoked by CMA stimulation therefore appears to 
be closer to a motivational drive than to an 
intentional decision. The evoked actions appear 
to happen  to the patient, but are quite decoupled 
from their conscious mental life, and play no 
role in it. This explains why the patient does not 
produce convincing or detailed reasons to 
explain why they occurred. 
 A Model of Frontal Contributions to 
Intentional Action 
 One simple model, which could encompass Libet 
et al.’s  (1983) concept of conscious intention, is 
shown in Figure  7.1 . Selection between competing 
alternative actions that are currently available 
might occur in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) (Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham,  2000 ). This process may involve 
conscious thought about the range of action 
alternatives, but only at the level of abstract 
action possibilities. The DLPFC selects the 
appropriate action, and forwards the decision to 
two separate cortical motor areas to implement 
it. On the one hand the decision is sent to the 
CMA, which provides a motivational drive to 
initiate the action. On the other hand the 
decision is sent to the preSMA, which provides a 
stage of ﬂ exible, contextual modulation of inter-
nally generated action, weaving the selected 
action into the ongoing ﬂ ow of behavior and 
experience. This ﬂ exibility is required since a 
behavior may be appropriate in one context but 
not in another: even a strongly motivated action 
can and should sometimes be stopped or delayed. 
PreSMA therefore provides contextual arbitra-
tion, according to which a drive may be devel-
oped into an impending action plan, or 
alternatively inhibited. This contextualizing role 
of preSMA can explain three speciﬁ c ﬁ ndings 
from the neurophysiological literature that may 
otherwise be hard to explain (see Haggard,  2008 , 
for a detailed review). First, cells in the preSMA 
appear to play a key role in integrating single 
actions into coordinated superordinate 
sequences of behavior. Second, lesions in this 
area produce compulsive action tendencies, 
reminiscent of the automatized reaching and 
grasping evoked by CMA stimulation. Third, the 
preSMA plays a key role in arbitrating involving 
conﬂ ict between the various alternative actions 
that could be consistent with a given situation. 
The preSMA is therefore involved not in the raw 
drive to action, but in reconciling action drives 
with current contexts. 
Contextualisation
CM
AP
re-
SM
A
DLPFC
SMAp/MI
Selection
Execution
Drive
 Figure 7.1 A simple model of the division of labor between frontal cortical areas in the initiation of 
intentional action. Selection between alternative action plans occurs in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC). The signal corresponding to the selected action is forwarded along two major neural pathways: to 
the cingulate motor area (CMA) to provide a motivated drive to perform the action, and to the presupple-
mentary motor area (preSMA) to modulate the action according to current context, competing action rep-
resentations, etc. Hypothesized interactions provide an arbitration between the push from drive and the 
constraints provided by context. Both areas have access to the main motor execution pathway via supple-
mentary motor area proper (SMAp) and the primary motor cortex (M1). 
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1  Interestingly, the conscious experience of 
immediate intention seems to involve the same 
circuits that contextually constrain action drives. 
The conscious “urge” evoked by preSMA stimu-
lation, which perhaps underliesW-judgments of 
intention in Libet-type experiments, would 
correspond to the moment of opening the gate 
between drive and motor action. The preSMA 
would then pass the contextualized action plan to 
the SMA-proper (SMAp), M1, and possibly CMA 
for execution. On this model, Libet is absolutely 
right that our actions are initiated unconsciously, 
by the normal functioning of the sensory and 
motor network of the cortex. The conscious expe-
rience of immediate intention occurs when the 
prefrontal executive opens the gates between this 
network and motor executive areas, such as M1, 
so that the drive built up within this network can 
now proceed to appropriate action execution. 
 What Are Immediate Intentions? 
 The discussion above allows us to revisit our ques-
tion, “what are immediate intentions?” From a 
neural point of view, immediate intentions are 
conscious experiences of impending action, gen-
erated by the motor systems of the medial frontal 
cortex. From a psychological point of view, two 
important aspects of immediate intention are 
worth emphasizing. First, immediate intentions 
are predictive, in the sense that they precede 
actions. Second, immediate intentions have an 
episodic, time-locked quality, rather than being 
abstract and semantic. Thus, the content of an 
immediate intention preﬁ gures at least some of 
the speciﬁ c motor details of the action itself. 
Immediate intentions are not linked to actions in 
a vague and general way, but in a motor-speciﬁ c 
way (Haggard & Eimer,  1999 ), even in artiﬁ cial 
cases such as preSMA stimulation (Fried et al, 
 1991 ). Put another way, immediate intentions 
incorporate the speciﬁ c contextual detail, corre-
sponding at least to the P-level and often to the 
M-level in the DPM hierarchy. An interesting con-
scious correlate of this episodic quality is the very 
integrated experience we have of our own volun-
tary action. Intention, action, and goal are not 
experienced as separate disconnected events, but 
as a tight and integrated ﬂ ow. In particular, inten-
tional actions, but not involuntary movements, 
display an effect called “intentional binding,” 
whereby the experiences of action and effect are 
perceived as temporally compressed and bound 
together (Haggard et al,  2002 ; Haggard & Cole, 
 2007 ), as if part of a single episode. 
 2. PROSPECTIVE INTENTIONS 
 We share with other animals the capacity to act 
purposefully, but we also regularly make more or 
less complex plans for the future, and our later 
conduct is guided by these plans. We are, in 
Michael Bratman’s words, planning agents, and 
this planning ability appears to be distinctively 
human. People can, and frequently do, form 
intentions focused on actions that may occur years 
or even decades later. Intentions to choose par-
ticular careers, to become prime minister, or to 
choose a destination for next year’s holiday all 
offer examples. The length of time-scale associ-
ated with prospective intentions is virtually unlim-
ited. These long-range intentions appear to be 
effectively connected with short-range intentions, 
and therefore with action itself. General intentions 
formed at one time-point cascade into much more 
detailed intentions prior to action execution. 
 However, almost nothing is known about 
how these long-range, prospective intentions 
connect to immediate, short-term intentions. 
Indeed, experimental studies of voluntary action 
deal hardly at all with the concept of prospective 
intention. On one view, the prospective inten-
tion in such studies consists in the participant’s 
decision to participate in the experiment in the 
ﬁ rst place, and thus lies beyond what can be 
measured in the experimental setting itself. 
 We start this section with a brief review of 
Bratman’s inﬂ uential account of prospective 
intentions (or as he calls them future-directed 
intentions), what their main characteristics are, 
and what makes it useful to have them. We then 
turn to the issue what kind of cognitive processes 
are involved in the formation of prospective 
intentions and how these relate to the processes 
involved in immediate intentions. 
 Bratman on Intentions 
 Bratman’s account of future-directed intentions 
(Bratman,  1987 ) stresses the commitment to 
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1 action that is a distinctive characteristic of inten-
tions. When I intend today to go Christmas 
shopping tomorrow, I do not simply want or 
desire today that I go Christmas shopping 
tomorrow. Rather I am committed now to going 
shopping tomorrow. What exactly does this 
commitment involve? Bratman distinguishes 
two dimensions of a commitment to action: 
a volitional dimension and a reasoning-centered 
dimension. The volitional dimension concerns 
the relation of intention to action and can be 
characterized by saying that, “intentions are, 
whereas ordinary desires are not, conduct- 
controlling pro-attitudes. Ordinary desires, in 
contrast, are merely  potential inﬂ uencers of 
action” (1987, p. 16). In other words, unless 
something unexpected arrives that forces me to 
revise my intention, my intention today to go 
shopping tomorrow will control my conduct 
tomorrow. The reasoning-centered dimension 
of commitment is most directly linked to 
planning. At stake here are the roles played by 
intentions in the period between their initial for-
mation and their eventual execution. First, 
intentions have what Bratman calls a character-
istic  stability or inertia: once we have formed an 
intention to  A , we will not normally continue to 
deliberate whether to  A or not. In the absence of 
relevant new information, the intention will 
resist reconsideration, we will see the matter as 
settled and continue to so intend until the time 
of action. Intentions are thus  terminators of 
practical reasoning about ends or goals. Second, 
during this period between the formation of an 
intention and action, we will frequently reason 
from such an intention to further intentions, 
reasoning from instance from intended ends to 
intended means or preliminary steps. When we 
ﬁ rst form an intention, our plans are typically 
only partial, but if they are to eventuate into 
action, they will need to be ﬁ lled in. Thus, inten-
tions are also  prompters of practical reasoning 
about means. Finally, the volitional and reason-
ing-centered dimensions of intentions together 
account for another important function of 
prospective intentions, namely their role in sup-
porting both  intrapersonal and interpersonal 
coordination . Because intentions have stability, 
are conduct-controlling, and prompt reasoning 
about means, they support the expectation that 
I will do tomorrow what I intend today to do 
tomorrow. Such expectations facilitate coordi-
nation. My intention to go Christmas shopping 
tomorrow supports my sister’s expectation that 
I will, and she can go ahead and plan to join me 
in this shopping expedition. Similarly, I can 
go ahead and plan my activities for the day 
after tomorrow, on the assumption that by 
tomorrow evening I will be done with Christmas 
shopping. 
 As noted by Bratman himself, future-directed 
intentions have an air of paradox. They are typi-
cally stable but they are not irrevocable. Such 
irrevocability would be irrational, since things 
can change and our anticipation of the future is 
not infallible. This suggests that, having formed 
today an intention to do something tomorrow,
I should persist in that intention tomorrow only 
if it would then be rational for me to form such 
an intention from scratch. But then, asks Bratman, 
why I should I bother deciding today what to do 
tomorrow? Isn’t that just a waste of time? 
 Bratman offers several complementary 
answers to that challenge. They stem from the 
fact that we are epistemically limited creatures, 
with limited cognitive and time resources for use 
in attending to problems, gathering informa-
tion, deliberating about options, determining 
likely consequences, and so on. There are several 
reasons our epistemic limitations make it useful 
for us to form prospective intentions. First, if 
our actions were inﬂ uenced by deliberation only 
at the time of action, this inﬂ uence would be 
minimal, as time pressure isn’t conducive to 
careful deliberation. Advance planning frees us 
from that time pressure and allows us to deploy 
the cognitive resources needed for successful 
deliberation. Second, intentions once formed 
have characteristic stability. They resist recon-
sideration. This doesn’t mean we never reconsider. 
Intentions may be revoked. But as Bratman 
points out, revocability does not entail actual 
reconsideration. Unless new facts come to light, 
we will normally simply retain our intentions. 
Furthermore, in settling on a course of action, 
we have already rehearsed and weighted the con-
siderations for and against that course of action. 
This prior rehearsal puts us in a better position 
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1 to assess whether a new piece of information is 
actually relevant or not to our plans. If nonre-
consideration is the default option, once an 
intention is formed the precious cognitive 
resources that were engaged in deliberation 
about ends are free be used for other tasks, 
including planning about means and ensuring 
both intra- and interpersonal coordination. 
To achieve complex goals, I must coordinate my 
present and future activities and coordinate with 
activities of other agents. If I now intend to go to 
the concert tomorrow night, I ﬁ rst need to pro-
cure a ticket and make sure I have a babysitter 
for the evening. If I were to leave it to the last 
minute to decide whether I go to concert tonight 
or not, I may well be frustrated to ﬁ nd out that 
tickets are sold out or that the babysitter is not 
available. Thus, the success of many of our 
actions depends on our ability to coordinate our 
own activities over time and to coordinate them 
with the activities of other agents. This coordi-
nation is best achieved if we plan ahead of time. 
 So-called Buridan cases provide a third reason 
for forming intentions. We may be forced to 
choose between options that we ﬁ nd equally 
desirable. I may have an equal desire to go to a 
concert or to go see a play tomorrow evening. 
But if I am to do either, I had better decide now 
among these options. For one thing, it may not 
be worth my while looking for further informa-
tion in the hope of ﬁ nding new reasons to decide 
between them, as the effort and time needed to 
gather further information may well exceed the 
potential beneﬁ ts of, say, enjoying the concert 
slightly more than I would have the play. 
Moreover, once again, intrapersonal and inter-
personal coordination require that I reach a deci-
sion. I need to know whether to buy a ticket for 
the play or for the concert, and if I wish friends to 
join me, I need to let them know whether I intend 
to go to the concert or to go see the play. 
 Future-Oriented Cognition and Mental 
Time Travel 
 Prima facie, it would seem that the reasons that 
make it useful for us to form prospective inten-
tions also apply to other species. Limited cogni-
tive resources and a need for coordination are 
not unique to humans. So why is it that we alone 
appear to exhibit such distinctive planning 
abilities? One obvious answer is that other species 
are even more limited then we are in their cogni-
tive resources; a complementary answer is that 
how much need and use we have for planning 
also depends on the kind of environment we live 
in. There wouldn’t be much use for planning in 
an environment that were completely unpredict-
able, for planning exploits regularities and in 
such an environment there would be none to 
exploit. On the other hand, in an environment 
both simple and reasonably predictable, there 
may be cheaper ways of coping than those 
involving advance planning. Suddendorf and 
Corballis,  (2007) describe several ways in which 
behavior may be future-oriented without involv-
ing a capacity to think about the future as such. 
First, future-directed behavior may be instinc-
tual, as when, through natural selection, a species 
has evolved behavioral predispositions to exploit 
signiﬁ cant long-term regularities. For instance, 
an animal can gather food for hibernation, 
although it has yet to experience a winter. 
Second, future-directed behavior may be driven 
by procedural learning, allowing an individual to 
track short-term regularities. For instance, 
through association, a conditioned stimulus can 
predict the future arrival of an unconditioned 
response and trigger a future-directed response. 
Third, future-directed behavior may exploit 
semantic memory about regularities, which 
provides the basis for inferential and analogical 
reasoning and allows learning in one context to 
be voluntarily transferred to another. Procedural 
learning allows for greater ﬂ exibility than instinc-
tual patterns of behavior, allowing behavior to 
be modulated by individual experience; seman-
tic memories provide even greater behavioral 
ﬂ exibility as they can be triggered endogenously 
rather than being stimulus bound. Yet, the envi-
ronment in which humans live is unique in both 
its ecological and its social complexity. Humans 
also have an extraordinary range of desires and 
motivations, going far beyond the basic drives 
and simpler desires present in other species. 
Dealing with this spectacular environmental, 
social, and motivational complexity may require 
in turn forms of future-oriented cognition that 
exhibit unique ﬂ exibility and versatility. 
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1  A prime candidate for this more ﬂ exible form 
of future-oriented cognition is  mental time 
travel , the faculty that allows a person to men-
tally project herself backward in time to relive 
past events or forward to pre-live events 
(Suddendorf & Corballis,  1997 ,  2007 ; Suddendorf 
& Busby,  2003 ,  2005 ; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 
 1997 ). Mental travel in the past, known as epi-
sodic memory, has been intensively studied (e.g., 
Tulving,  1983 ,  2005 ). Mental travel into the 
future, in contrast, has only recently begun to 
draw attention. Recent work indicates that 
mental travel into the past and into the future 
are closely related, involving similar cognitive 
processes — a combination of episodic memory 
and imagination under executive control — and 
recruiting strongly overlapping neural systems 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,  2006 ; 
Hassabis, Vann, & Magurie,  2007 ; Klein,  2002 ; 
Gerrans,  2007 ). Several researchers have argued 
that mental time travel into the future is a crucial 
cognitive adaptation, enhancing planning and 
deliberation by allowing a subject to mentally 
simulate and evaluate contingencies, and thus 
enhancing ﬁ tness, and that mental time travel 
into the past is subsidiary to our ability to imag-
ine future scenarios (Dudai & Carruthers,  2005 ; 
Suddendorf & Corballis,  2007 ). 
 Mental time travel, whether into the past 
or into the future, involves episodic memory 
and inherits its two main characteristics. First, it 
is not about regularities but about constructing 
or reconstructing the  particularities of speciﬁ c 
events . Second, mental time travel involves 
 autonoesis , i.e., awareness of a self as the subject 
of actual, recalled, or imagined experience. But 
what are exactly the beneﬁ ts that accrue from 
using mental time travel rather than simply 
reasoning from general knowledge stored in 
semantic memory in planning future actions? 
As we have seen, prospective intentions involve 
making a number of decisions. The intention 
is ﬁ rst formed when one reaches a decision about 
what to do. Once the intention is formed, 
one must still typically make a number of 
decisions about how to implement the chosen 
goal. Another important decision, not explicitly 
considered by Bratman, concerns when to 
act. What can mental time travel contribute to 
these what-decisions, how-decisions, and when-
decisions? 
 What-decisions 
 Not all what-decisions involve explicit conscious 
deliberation. Some decisions are pretty straight-
forward. If my closest friend invites me to her 
wedding, of course I’ll accept the invitation and 
form the intention to attend the wedding. 
If, however, being on the job market, I am offered 
academic positions in two different universities, 
I might spend quite a while weighing the pros 
and cons of each option before reaching a deci-
sion. Yet, it may be that performing a logical 
cost-beneﬁ t analysis of the two options does not 
sufﬁ ce to motivate me to choose one over the 
other, even if this analysis yields a clear advan-
tage for one of the options. Rather, I might have 
to imaginatively rehearse future experiences 
occupying one or the other position as part of 
the process of deliberation. 
 Patients with damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are often described 
as having impaired ability for planning and 
decision-making despite retaining intact capaci-
ties for explicit reasoning. Philip Gerrans,  (2007) 
argues that this impairment is best explained by 
a deﬁ cit in mental time travel. In his view, 
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio,  1991 ; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Lee,  1999 ), according to which the 
deﬁ cits of VMPFC patients result from a failure 
to link an implicit emotional response — a 
somatic marker — with an explicit representation 
of a situation, is deﬁ cient in two ways. First, it 
uses an account of emotions that explains 
salience and motivation in terms of valence and 
within this framework interprets somatic markers 
as valencing systems whose activation is required 
to produce suitable motivation. However, recent 
research shows that the mechanisms that make 
objects salient and motivate behavior are inde-
pendent neurally and cognitively from those that 
determine valence. The mesolimbic dopamine 
system plays a central role in salience/motivation 
by predicting reward (rather than valence), while 
valencing appears to be realized by a number of 
other systems, including the opioid and benzo-
diazepine systems (Berridge & Robinson,  2003 ; 
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1 Berridge,  2007 ; Robinson & Berridge,  2003 ). 
Second, the somatic marker hypothesis under-
speciﬁ es the nature of the explicit representa-
tions involved in decision-making. These 
representations can either be declarative, as 
when one performs cost-beneﬁ t analysis by 
manipulating probabilities, or episodic, as when 
one uses past experiences to imagine future ones. 
According to Gerrans then, the planning and 
decision-making deﬁ cits of VMPFC patients 
result not so much from their inability to associ-
ate semantic markers to their explicit declarative 
representations as from their inability to 
perform mental time travel, that is to imagine 
themselves living out future scenarios and thus 
activating the motivationally relevant contin-
gencies salient in these imagined experiences. 
 If this conception of the link between mental 
time travel and motivation is on the right track, 
mental time travel could also help explain one 
unique characteristic of human planning. 
According to the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis 
(Bischof-Köhler,  1985 ; Suddendorf & B usby, 
2005 ), nonhuman animals cannot anticipate 
future needs or drive states. Humans, in 
contrast, can plan for the future not just on the 
basis on their current motivational states but 
also on the basis of what they anticipate their 
future motivational states to be. The ability to 
project oneself forward in time and imagine 
future scenarios may be an important key to 
motivation regulation. 
 How-decisions 
 The construction of plans for future actions 
depends in part on semantic memory, since it is 
crucial to their success that the plans we come up 
with be consistent with our general knowledge 
about the world. Yet, ﬁ lling in the details of a 
plan may depend on our ability to imagine future 
episodes, since they provide the particularities 
that will help us ﬁ ne-tune the plan to the partic-
ular occasion. However, trade-offs need to be 
considered, since mental time travel is effortful 
and cognitively costly. When I form the prospec-
tive intention to go to my ofﬁ ce tomorrow rather 
than to work from home, there is no need for me 
to mentally rehearse the route to my ofﬁ ce. 
The route is familiar enough that I can trust 
myself to do the right thing when the time comes. 
Suppose, however, that I have an appointment 
tomorrow in some other part of the city I am less 
familiar with. In that case, it may be worthwhile 
rehearsing possible ways of getting there and 
using memories of past episodes to decide 
between options. For instance, I may remember 
that changing lines at this station takes forever 
and involves walking along endless, badly lit, 
corridors, or I may remember getting stuck in 
heavy trafﬁ c on a given bus line. Or imagine 
again, I am about to visit Beijing for the ﬁ rst time 
and have no clue what the public transportation 
is like there. In such a case it may be a waste of 
time and energy imagining potential future 
scenarios for how to get around in Beijing. 
The scenarios I come up with may be far off the 
mark and completely useless in the end; better 
just way and see. 
 More generally, whether we make how-
decisions early or late and the extent to which we 
use mental time travel to make those decisions 
depends on a number of factors, among them: 
how predictable we think the future situation is; 
how knowledgeable we are; whether our knowl-
edge is mostly declarative or based on prior 
personal experience; how motivated we are 
(as rehearsing a future scenario may help rein-
force motivation); how novel or difﬁ cult the 
prospective action is; how neurotic our person-
ality is. In addition, there appear to be important 
individual differences in the ability to project 
oneself into possible future events. A recent 
study (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,  2006 ) 
provides evidence that the individual differences 
in dimensions known to affect memory for past 
events similarly inﬂ uence the experience of 
projecting oneself into the future. People less 
adept at recalling in vivid detail past episodes of 
their life, are also less able to simulate speciﬁ c 
future events. Note that these results also 
provide support for the view that mental time 
travel into the past and mental time travel into 
the future rely on similar mechanisms. 
 When-decisions 
 A prospective intention is an intention to perform 
an action at some future time. But if the intention 
is to eventuate into action, it is important that the 
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1 time of action be speciﬁ ed. An initial when-
decision can take at least two forms. The time of 
action can be speciﬁ ed in explicit temporal 
fashion, say as “next Tuesday” or “on the ﬁ rst of 
November” or it can be speciﬁ ed in relation to 
some speciﬁ c future event, say “when I next meet 
Charles” or “as soon as the bell rings.” Work in 
the ﬁ eld of prospective memory sheds light on 
interesting differences between the time-based 
and the event-based strategies. 
 Prospective memory is a ﬁ eld of cognitive 
psychology dealing with remembering to 
perform an action in the future (e.g., I must 
remember to stop to buy fruit on my way home 
from work). The starting point for prospective 
memory is clearly an intention to perform an 
action at a future time. Most experimental studies 
deal with event-based prospective memory, in 
which a speciﬁ c event that will occur in the 
future is used as a cue for an action. Translating 
a long-range intention into action then becomes 
a matter of identifying that the cue has occurred, 
and retrieving the appropriate action in response 
to it. Several studies of “implementation inten-
tions” in applied psychology (Gollwitzer,  1999 ), 
suggest this strategy is effective: intended actions 
such as taking medication are more likely to 
occur if people link their implementation to a 
speciﬁ c external event. According to Gollwitzer, 
 (1999) , what explains the efﬁ cacy of implemen-
tation intentions is the fact that their formation 
triggers two sets of processes. First, when an 
implementation intention is formed, mental 
representations of the relevant situational cues 
become highly activated, leading to heightened 
accessibility, and thus a better detection, of these 
cues when they are encountered (Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis, & Midden,  1999 ; Gollwitzer,  1999 ; 
Webb & Sheeran,  2007 ). Second, implementa-
tion intention formation not only enhances the 
accessibility of the speciﬁ ed situational cue, 
but also forges an association between that cue 
and a response that is instrumental for obtaining 
one’s goal, thus making action initiation more 
immediate and efﬁ cient. 
 Such “implementation intentions” may take 
advantage of the fact that externally cued inten-
tions are normally more strongly held, in the 
sense of being harder to overturn, than internally 
generated intentions (Fleming, Mars, Gladwin, 
& Haggard,  2009 ). 
 Prospective memory can also be time-based, 
rather than event-based. In time-based prospec-
tive memory, an intended action is performed at 
a designated future time, without any particular 
cue event occurring at that time. Thus, time-
based prospective memory seems to be purely 
endogenous, while event-based prospective 
memory effectively reduces endogenous actions 
to cue-triggered reactions. The distinction 
between the two forms is supported by the 
dissociation between different rostral prefrontal 
activations in time-based and event-based 
prospective memory tasks (Okuda et al.,  2007 ). 
 Recent studies of time-based prospective 
memory suggest an interesting role for uncon-
sciously initiated processes, similar to Libet’s 
action initiation, in linking long-range inten-
tions to eventual action. Kvavilashvili and Fisher 
 (2007) asked participants to call an experimenter 
at a self-chosen time one week after an initial 
brieﬁ ng session. In the intervening week, they 
noted the circumstances in which they remem-
bered this intention, using a diary. Although the 
authors refer to these memory events as “rehears-
als” they were primarily automatic and uncued 
events, in which the intention to make the phone 
call simply “popped into” the participant’s mind, 
without obvious cue or antecedent. The frequency 
of these recall events increased dramatically in 
the day before the phone call was due, but this 
increase was less dramatic in those participants 
who in fact failed to return the phone call on 
time. 
 3. LINKING PROSPECTIVE 
INTENTIONS TO IMMEDIATE 
INTENTIONS 
 Actions are not always the product of prospective 
intentions, they may often simply be the outcome 
of immediate intentions, formed on the spot, so 
to speak. But let us focus on cases where actions 
are preceded and brought about by prospective 
intentions. What is the additional contribution, 
if any, of immediate intentions to such actions? 
 Recall that in the section 1 we characterized 
the content of immediate intentions as involving 
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1 episodic representations. Forming an immediate 
intention involves ﬁ tting one’s endogenous goal 
to the current situation, using contextual infor-
mation to generate a representation of a speciﬁ c 
episode of acting. When one has a prospective 
intention to perform an action, how much work 
there is left for an immediate intention to do 
at the moment of action itself will depend on 
how episodic the content of the prospective 
intention already is. This will in turn depend on 
the extent to which the agent made use of mental 
time travel in forming and shaping his prospec-
tive intentions. For example, a person forming a 
prospective intention may become fully involved 
in mental time travel and may simulate the full 
details of how and when the action will occur. 
Conversely, one can have a genuine prospective 
intention while knowingly leaving it for later to 
decide on the means. At one extreme of a 
continuum is the “neurotic planner,” at the 
other end is the “optimistic improviser.” 
 The neurotic planner makes extensive use of 
mental time travel, imaginatively combining and 
recombining elements from prior stored 
episodes to generate, early on, precise scenarios 
concerning the action to be performed and 
the situation in which it is to be performed. 
His strategy is to generate as much episodic 
information as he can as early as he can. When 
mental time travel serves well, this front-loading 
strategy leaves little left for immediate intentions 
to do. 
 Using Gollwitzer’s terminology, we can say 
that neurotic planners tend to make early 
detailed how- and when-decisions, thus forming 
implementation intentions. A key feature of this 
strategy of early planning is that it allows for 
later automatization. As Gollwitzer points out, 
implementation intentions automatize action 
initiation: “The goal-directed behavior speciﬁ ed 
in an implementation intention is triggered 
without conscious intent once the critical situa-
tional context is encountered” (Gollwitzer,  1999 , 
p. 498). Thus, the use of external cues to trigger 
action seems partly to shift the action from an 
endogenous or voluntary one to a stimulus-
driven or reactive one. 
 In contrast, the optimistic improviser gener-
ates little episodic information early on. She makes 
a what-decision, possibly a time-based when-
decision, but keeps her options open as to how 
and in what speciﬁ c situation the action is to be 
performed. She is committed to generating rele-
vant episodic information in real time, at the 
moment of the action itself. The prospective 
intentions of agents following this strategy con-
tain as yet too little episodic information to yield 
action. To ﬁ ll this informational gap between her 
prospective intention and action initiation, the 
agent will have to form an immediate intention 
specifying the missing information. This means 
that the agent must retain some endogenous con-
trol over action initiation and cannot delegate it to 
automatic responses to environmental triggers. 
 Episodic information must be generated in 
order to produce a speciﬁ c action. It can be gen-
erated either early (neurotic planner) or later 
(optimistic improviser). These are in some sense 
alternative reciprocal responses to the common 
challenge of deciding exactly what one will do. 
Despite the personality-based labels we used, 
early versus late planning isn’t just a matter of 
temperament. Each strategy may be better suited 
to some situations than to others. Early planning 
has its dangers. If the agent’s anticipations were 
not correct, the external cues on which action 
initiation depends may fail to materialize. Or, 
worse perhaps, the cues may be present and 
automatically trigger the action when other 
unanticipated and unattended aspects of the 
situation make it unadvisable to pursue as 
planned. The late planner may be more ﬂ exible, 
but she risks unpreparedness when the time of 
acting comes. Having left it to the last moment 
to deliberate about means, when she ﬁ nally does 
so she also risks reopening the Pandora’s box of 
deliberation about ends. What-decisions and 
how-decisions aren’t strictly compartmentalized. 
The costs and efforts involved in deliberating 
about how to  A under time pressure, may lead 
one to reconsider whether to  A in the ﬁ rst place, 
when giving up  A -ing may well tempt us as the 
less costly option. 
 Often, and perhaps most of the time, our plan-
ning strategies will be mixed strategies, taking 
into account various factors beyond mere tepera-
ment; among them, the expected predictability of 
relevant future situations, one’s store of relevant 
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1 semantic and episodic information, one’s degree 
of motivation, the degree of novelty or difﬁ culty 
of the planned action, and how strong one thinks 
time constraints will be at the time of acting. The 
generation of episodic information about future 
actions will thus be distributed over time in vari-
ous ways according to our assessment of these 
factors. One example of these differing distribu-
tions comes from the contrast between an event-
based and time-based prospective memory. In 
event-based prospective memory, speciﬁ c details 
of the action episode are already present in the 
prospective intention itself. In contrast, time-
based prospective memory lacks any concrete 
details about the speciﬁ c context in which the 
action will occur. Most people can and do 
use both forms of planning. This ﬂ exibility in 
the temporal distribution of episodic information 
is a fundamental dimension of the psychology 
of intention. The skilled planner is the one 
who knows how best to take advantage of this 
ﬂ exibility. 
 4. CONCLUSION 
 The concept of intention can do useful work in 
psychological theory. We have made a distinc-
tion between prospective and immediate inten-
tions. Many authors have insisted on a qualitative 
difference between these two regarding the type 
of content, with prospective intentions generally 
being more abstract than immediate intentions 
(e.g., Searle,  1983 ; Pacherie,  2008 ). However, we 
suggest that the main basis of this distinction is 
temporal: prospective intentions necessarily 
occur before immediate intention and before 
action itself, and often long before them. In con-
trast, immediate intentions occur in the speciﬁ c 
context of the action itself. Yet both types of 
intention share a common purpose, namely that 
of generating the speciﬁ c information required 
to transform an abstract representation of a goal-
state into a concrete episode of instrumental 
action directed toward that goal. To this extent, 
the content of a prospective and of an immediate 
intention can actually be quite similar. The main 
distinction between prospective and immediate 
intentions becomes one of when, i.e., how early 
on, the episodic details of an action are planned. 
 In our view, the conscious experience associ-
ated with intentional action comes from this 
process of ﬂ eshing out intentions with episodic 
details. In the ﬁ eld of episodic memory, repre-
sentations of episodes are thought to include an 
autonoetic type of consciousness (Tulving,  1983 ). 
We suggest that intentional actions reach con-
scious awareness at the point where they become 
speciﬁ c action episodes. However, the time when 
this occurs can vary. We have argued that 
episodic detail can be generated either as part of 
advance planning, in the form of prospective 
intentions, or as part of an immediate intention 
in real time. In the former case, one might have 
a conscious mental image of what one will do, 
but the doing itself may be automatized and only 
marginally conscious. In the latter case, one may 
have a speciﬁ c conscious experience linked to 
the initiation of action, along the lines studied by 
Libet. 
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